The role of the rule of law in ASEAN integration by EWING-CHOW, Michael & HSIEN-LI, Tan
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2013/16 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-41 
The Role of the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration 
 
Michael Ewing-Chow and Tan Hsien-Li 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
 
 
The Role of the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration 
 
  
 
Michael Ewing-Chow and Tan Hsien-Li 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/16 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Michael Ewing-Chow and Tan Hsien-Li, 2013 
Printed in Italy, March 2013 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European 
setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research 
and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative and innovative solutions to global 
challenges. 
The GGP comprises three core dimensions: research, policy and training. Diverse global governance 
issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the 
EUI and from other internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed 
throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy Seminars, which bring 
together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global 
importance.The Academy of Global Governance (AGG) is a unique executive training programme 
where theory and “real world” experience meet. Young executives, policy makers, diplomats, 
officials, private sector professionals and junior academics, have the opportunity to meet, share views 
and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations and senior 
executives, on topical issues relating to governance. 
 
For more information:  
http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
  
Abstract 
From its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has relied more on diplomacy rather than law. Political 
relations were managed by consultation and consensus and declaratory statements, while treaties 
denoting binding legal obligations were few. However, upon its 40th anniversary in 2007, the ASEAN 
Charter vowing to bring the Legal and the Institutional to the forefront of ASEAN discourse was 
signed. Blueprints for the three ASEAN pillars – the Political-Security, Economic and Socio-Cultural 
Communities – were also adopted alongside numerous new treaties with detailed obligations and 
dispute settlement procedures. This paper explores the aspirations, realities and limitations as the 
regional organisation endeavours to develop into an integrated ASEAN Community by 2015, paying 
particular attention to the new role of law in regional relations.  
Keywords 
ASEAN – legal integration – institutions – economic cooperation – political-security cooperation
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Introduction 
From the time of its establishment in 1967 under the Bangkok Declaration, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has relied more on diplomacy rather than law. Political relations 
within the region were managed by consultation and consensus and declaratory statements, while 
treaties denoting binding legal obligations – particularly with effective dispute settlement mechanisms 
– were few. The founders of ASEAN responded to the existing regional distrust created by some prior 
military confrontations by focusing on confidence-building activities rather than any concrete 
integration efforts. The discourse of ASEAN at that time, in contrast to the European experience, may 
in hindsight be said to be marked by the absence of any grand ambition or deep theory.  
However, upon the 40th anniversary of this regional organisation in 2007, the ten ASEAN member 
states signed the ASEAN Charter stating that: “We, the Peoples of the member states of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations … [h]ereby decide to establish, through this Charter, the 
legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.” For the first time in its history of over four decades, 
the Legal and the Institutional were brought to the forefront of ASEAN discourse. Blueprints for each 
of the three ASEAN Communities – the Political-Security Community, Economic Community and 
Socio-Cultural Community – have also been formulated and adopted as well as numerous new treaties 
and protocols often with detailed obligations and dispute settlement procedures.  
This paper aims to explore the aspirations, realities and limitations as the regional organisation 
endeavours to develop into an integrated ASEAN Community by 2015. In particular, we shall attempt 
to understand this new role of law in ASEAN from both a historical and a normative perspective.  
Divided into three sections, Part I analyses the core intentions of ASEAN Integration – “Peace and 
Prosperity”1 – and how these evolved into ASEAN Integration as it means in the present context. As 
with other regional integration experiences, it is often in the economic areas that states most readily 
agree to cooperate and even cede a certain amount of sovereignty. However, unlike the EU, the pay-
off for this does not seem to be an integrated market in any sense as the amount of intra-regional trade 
remains stagnant at about 25%. The low GDP per capita of most of the ASEAN states make it unlikely 
that the consumer goods produced and exported by these states to the West will be exported in 
significant volumes to other ASEAN states in the near future. Instead, the integration phenomenon 
seems more driven by production integration than market integration.  
Part II goes on to articulate the fundamental structures ASEAN needs in its integration exercise. 
Having weathered severe international and intra-regional geo-political and economic storms, ASEAN 
possesses deep-seated insecurity about being irrelevant on the global plane. This underlying anxiety of 
being sidelined is a main reason for ASEAN’s development and transformation through the years. 
ASEAN understands the need for greater clarity in intra-ASEAN and international relations if it is to 
be taken seriously by global actors, hence there is the emphasis on the rule of law as ASEAN 
integrates. Here, we unpack the core infrastructure that ASEAN needs to reach its goal of regional 
integration. These are institutions, legalisation, and mechanisms for resolving disputes.  
Whereupon ASEAN Integration is the most rapid in the second pillar, Part III examines the pace of 
integration in the other two pillars – the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities – 
with a case-study on an ASEAN body that is arguably at the at the other end of the spectrum, the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Straddling both the first and 
third pillars, we find that the AICHR experience of trying to consolidate itself to be effective 
                                                     
1
 Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967, at 
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showcases most lucidly the extreme difficulties of regional integration on political, security, social, 
cultural matters.  
I. Spearheading ASEAN Integration through economic cooperation  
ASEAN’s vision for regional integration and community-building2 
In 1997, the ten ASEAN member states clearly proclaimed their vision for closer integration as a 
region: 
ASEAN shall have, by the year 2020, established a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each 
nation is at peace with itself and where the causes for conflict have been eliminated, through 
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and through the strengthening of national and 
regional resilience… 
We will create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which 
there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic 
development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities... 
We see vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, 
where all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of 
gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background.
3
 
In adopting this Vision, the regional grouping enunciated its goal of becoming a community which 
would resolve disputes peacefully, forge closer economic integration, and be bound by a common 
regional identity by 2020.
4
 These three-fold aspirations were the foundations upon which ASEAN 
built its plans of achieving a tri-pillared ASEAN Community, proclaiming in the 2003 Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) that the 
ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security 
cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in 
the region.
5
 
This was eventually laid out as the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).
6
 As momentum built 
toward the signing of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN member states undertook to accelerate the 
formation of the ASEAN Community by 2015 at the 13
th
 ASEAN Summit in January 2007.
7
  
The ASEAN Charter was signed in November 2007 and came into force on 15 December 2008
8
 
when all ten ASEAN members had ratified it despite some hesitation on the part of some members 
                                                     
2
 The legal and institutional undertaking by ASEAN since 2007 is immense and has profound ramifications. Professor 
Joseph Weiler, Professor Michael Ewing-Chow and Dr Tan Hsien-Li are currently directing the ASEAN Integration 
Through Law Project at the Centre for International Law (CIL), National University of Singapore. The Project involves 
over 70 researchers from Asia and around the world. This Project aims to support the integration efforts of ASEAN 
member states. See http://cil.nus.edu.sg/research-projects/asean 
3
 ASEAN Vision 2020, available at http://www.asean.org/1814.htm.  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) 2003, para. 1 at http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 (2007) at 
http://www.aseansec.org/19260.htm. 
8
 ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter Comes into Force Today (15 December 2008), at 
http://www.asean.org/Bulletin-Dec-08.htm#Article-4. 
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over the Myanmar problem.
9
 Alongside the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 were the seminal 
documents mapping out the steps for the integration of ASEAN into a tri-pillared Community. These 
are namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint,
10
 ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint,
11
 and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint
12
 which have been compiled and 
renamed as the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 (the “Roadmap”).13 
Before discussing the role of the rule of law in ASEAN Integration, it is important to note that 
while the word “integration” has only been used in ASEAN documents in the context of the AEC and 
the language referring to the other two pillars tends to be more visionary and inspirational than 
hortatory or programmatic, the very idea of an ASEAN Community supported by three pillar 
Communities suggests an aspiration towards integration at some level. If so, the text of ASEAN 
Vision 2020 and the Roadmap states a level of ambition beyond any other previous regional 
integration projects save that of the European Union. 
At this juncture, it might also be appropriate to map out the differences between the obvious 
comparator – the experience of European Integration – and to state at the outset that a direct 
comparison would not only be simplistic and impressionistic but also deeply flawed. The history of 
ASEAN, its great diversity, and the very different political economy of the region militates against 
measuring ASEAN Integration by the experiences of the EU and of forecasting its future by 
referencing a European past. The vision for ASEAN integration will have to be applied to a landscape 
that is significantly different from what the EU was built upon. 
Politically and economically, there are major differences – even fundamental ones – between the 
EU and ASEAN. Politically, the EU vision is conveyed by the words in the preamble to the 1957 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) where 
signatories were expressly “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”.14 This is a farsighted goal and all member states need to subscribe to that goal. 
Temporary derogations and transitional periods are granted but the goal is there for all to strive 
toward. This European undertaking goes far beyond what ASEAN could plausibly agree to, based on 
practical economic considerations. This is starkly demonstrated when comparing the member state 
economies – the economy of the EU member states shows a ratio of between its highest GDP per 
capita (PPP), Luxembourg, and that of its lowest, Bulgaria, at approximately 17:1 as compared to 
ASEAN with a ratio between the highest GDP per capita, Singapore, and the lowest GDP per capita, 
Myanmar, standing at 63:1.
15
  
Moreover, when the European Integration project was conceptualised, France and Germany, the 
two largest and most economically powerful members, were able to form an alliance that propelled the 
project. By contrast, ASEAN lacks such a driving force. Indonesia with a population of about 240 
million and a territory of 1.9 million square kilometres is the largest ASEAN member by far. Indeed, 
the population of Indonesia is almost equal to that of all the other ASEAN countries put together. 
However, despite Indonesia dwarfing its ASEAN neighbours geographically and in terms of 
population, it has a much lower GDP per capita than many other ASEAN members. The Indonesians 
remain sceptical – and in some segments of the population, divided – about the virtues of ASEAN 
Integration, particularly economic integration. Notably, also, the two ASEAN members with the 
                                                     
9
 “Burma Ratifies ASEAN Charter”, The Australian, 22 July 2008.  
10
 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint at http://www.aseansec.org/21083.pdf 
11
 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint at http://www.aseansec.org/21083.pdf 
12
 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint at http://www.aseansec.org/5187-19.pdf 
13
 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 at 
 http://www.aseansec.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf 
14
 Treaty of Rome (1957) at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf 
15
 Based on IMF 2011 data on GDP per capita in USD (estimated). 
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highest GDP per capita in ASEAN, Brunei and Singapore, are the smallest states. They are unable to 
form the backbone of any integration project in a way that the Franco-German alliance has done over 
the past decades.  
One last point of importance should also be borne in mind. Unlike the integration efforts of Europe 
which have seen the inclusion of states which may be characterised as democracies, the political 
systems of ASEAN members are much more diverse. They range from active democracies in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, one party-dominated democracies like Malaysia and Singapore, a 
military dominated presidential republic in Myanmar, socialist states in the case of Vietnam or Laos, a 
constitutional monarchy in Cambodia and Thailand, and a traditional monarchy in the case of Brunei. 
Yet, despite these obvious differences in their political systems, these differences do not even 
adequately begin to highlight the even greater diversity of the role of law and the rule of law in each of 
the ASEAN member states.  
Puchala once famously observed that the difficulty of defining integration was similar to the story 
of the blind men who attempted to describe an elephant.
16
 The beast was so big and each perceived it 
only through his experience with the beast but each had enough evidence to disbelieve the others and 
to “maintain a lively debate about the nature of the beast”.17 This has indeed been the case for ASEAN 
and has been made worse by the constantly evolving nature of ASEAN. 
The original reason for ASEAN 
To understand the ongoing process of ASEAN integration fully, it is necessary to grasp the essential 
reasons for the founding of the organisation, the manner in which it developed, and its modus operandi 
in international and regional relations. 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the Bangkok 
Declaration (“the Declaration”)18 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Brunei Darussalam then joined on 8 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar 
on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, thereby making up what is today the ten member 
states of ASEAN. 
Prior to the founding of ASEAN, from 1962 to 1966, an undeclared military conflict between 
Indonesia and Malaysia (which included Singapore for part of that time) known as the Konfrontasi 
was a major source of tension in the region. While purportedly a dispute over the island of Borneo, it 
was also an exercise in hegemony by the Sukarno government of Indonesia. The Konfrontasi was 
marked by several relatively small skirmishes but resulted in the breaking off of diplomatic relations 
between Malaysia and Indonesia and strained diplomatic ties between the parties and other Southeast 
Asian nations. At the same time, the Vietnam war was escalating and many countries in the region 
feared that communism in the region would spread as predicted by the domino theory.  
Thus, when General Suharto ousted President Sukarno in 1966, the five founding members of 
ASEAN quickly moved to restore diplomatic ties and created an organisation to encourage peaceful 
relations with each other and limit external interference. This initial raison d’être found its clearest 
expression in the 1979 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,
19
 which provided that ASEAN members 
would abide by the following principles: 
a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national 
identity of all nations;  
                                                     
16
 Donald J Puchala, Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration (1971) 10 JCMS 267 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Supra note 1. 
19
 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), 24 February 1976, at http://www.asean.org/1217.htm.  
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b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion;  
c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;  
d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;  
e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
f) Effective cooperation among themselves.20 
These principles have led ASEAN to develop what has been known as “the ASEAN Way” of 
cooperation and dispute resolution in which members do not interfere with the internal affairs of other 
members and decision-making (as well as dispute resolution) is done only by consensus. While this 
has enabled ASEAN to develop (albeit as a relatively loosely integrated organisation), ASEAN has 
often been criticised for its ASEAN Way and its seeming adherence to the principle of non-
interference.
21
 Many commentators suggest that this adherence to non-interference and consensus 
undermines the rule of law and ASEAN’s seriousness to integrate.22 ASEAN has usually responded 
that, culturally speaking,
23
 the ASEAN Way was a more effective method to resolving disputes in 
South East Asia.
24
 Indeed, at the recent 14
th
 ASEAN Summit in Thailand, the new ASEAN Anthem, 
“The ASEAN Way” was officially introduced with the lyrics proclaiming “we dare to dream, we care 
to share, for it's the way of ASEAN”.25 
Over the decades, as the threat of the spread of communism and regional military conflicts 
diminished, economic cooperation between ASEAN member states has begun to take on more 
prominence. This change may be attributed to the oft-referred to Bicycle Theory of integration – like a 
bicycle, integration projects must keep have some minimum forward momentum otherwise they will 
fall. With this new focus on economic integration in ASEAN, there has been the increased adoption of 
legally-binding frameworks to govern economic relations between member states.
26
  
Indeed, economic cooperation has been the main driving force behind ASEAN Community-
building and integration efforts thus far. The first generation of economic agreements adopted by 
ASEAN include the 1977 Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements,
27
 the 1979 
Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve,
28
 and the 1980 Basic Agreement on ASEAN 
                                                     
20
 Ibid, Article 2. 
21
 See e.g Gillian Goh, The ‘ASEAN Way’: Non-intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management, 3 Stanford 
Journal of East Asian Affairs (2003) 113 ; Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN : Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) for an overview of the criticism and a response that separates the ‘ASEAN 
Way’ and the principle of non-intervention. For a historical perspective of the ASEAN Way, see Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a security community in southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (Abingdon, Oxon; New 
York: Routledge, 2009) 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 We will examine later in this paper whether the word “culturally” is an appropriate word to use in explaining the ASEAN 
Way. It suffices at this stage to note that the word does not evoke any of the old Asian values debate but seems to 
describe a preference based on strategic interests. 
24
 TAC, supra note 19. 
25
 See ASEAN Anthem Competition, at http://www.14thaseansummit.org/thailand_activities_01.php.  
26
 Paul J Davidson, “The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Cooperation” (2004) 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 165 at 
168–169.  
27
 Agreement On ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, 24 February 1977, at http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm 
28
 Agreement On The ASEAN Food Security Reserve, 4 October 1979, at http://www.aseansec.org/1315.htm 
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Industrial Projects.
29
 These were early examples of ASEAN members entering into legally-binding 
instruments to facilitate economic cooperation.
30
 
In 1992, legal rationalisation took place within the context of the Framework Agreements for 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (“Framework Agreements”).31 As these were framework 
agreements, they mainly affirm ASEAN members’ commitment to cooperate in various economic 
areas; they do not contain any specific binding legal obligations on economic cooperation.
32
 However, 
agreements containing more precise binding terms have been enacted by members to implement the 
mandate of the Framework Agreements.
33
 
More recently and perhaps seminally, the ASEAN Charter was signed on 20 November 2007 at the 
13
th
 ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Notably, in setting out the purposes of ASEAN, Article 1 of the 
Charter expressly included that ASEAN was “to create a single market34 and production base”.35 This 
economic goal was further elaborated in the AEC Blueprint
36
 for implementation by 2015. In adopting 
the AEC Blueprint subsequent to the ASEAN Charter at the 13
th
 Summit, the ASEAN member states 
iterated in the Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community
37
 that: 
[T]he AEC Blueprint will transform ASEAN into a single market
38
 and production base, a highly 
competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully 
integrated into the global economy.
39
 
All of this suggests that, at least initially, much of ASEAN’s raison d’étre was more either based on 
realism, the self-interest of each state or at best functionalism based on the common interests of each 
state.
40
 ASEAN arose not from the ashes of the Second World War but from the realpolitik of the Cold 
War. 
                                                     
29
 Basic Agreement On ASEAN Industrial Projects, Kuala Lumpur, 6 March 1980, at http://www.aseansec.org/1362.htm 
30
 Ong Keng Yong, “ASEAN and the 3 L’s: Leaders, Laymen and Lawyers”, at http://www.asean.org/17356.htm. 
31
 Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, ASEAN member states, 28 January 1992, at 
http://www.asean.org/12374.htm. 
32
 See generally ibid. 
33
 See e.g. the various instruments enacted to implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at 
http://www.asean.org/12039.htm. 
34
 The AEC will have free movement of goods, services, skilled labour and freer movement of capital but is unlikely to be a 
custom union. This is unlikely because a customs union has to create a common external tariff policy. Singapore has an 
almost zero tariff policy (only beer, stout, samsu and medicated samsu are subject to tariffs though a universal excise tax 
is imposed on goods such as cigarettes, automobiles and wine). This means that Singapore’s tariffs will have to go up or 
that other ASEAN members will have to go down significantly to implement a common external tariff policy. Further, 
Singapore will have to give up many of its FTAs with non-ASEAN partners unless they agree with all the other ASEAN 
partners or the preferential tariff rates are harmonised with the ASEAN common external tariff rates (thus, making the 
FTAs superfluous at least for goods). 
35
 ASEAN Charter, 20 November 2007, Article 1(5) at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2007/2007-charter-of-the-association-of-
southeast-asian-nations-signed-on-20-november-2007-in-singapore-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/.  
36
 AEC Blueprint, supra note 11.  
37
 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, at http://www.asean.org/21081.htm. 
38
 To most people, a single market is synonymous with a customs union which also includes not just free movement of 
goods but also of labour, services and capital. The most famous single market, the European Union (EU) began life as the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (Treaty of Paris (1951)) and went on to become the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957 (Treaty of Rome (1957)) (when it become known in Britain and Ireland as "the Common 
Market"). The abolition of internal tariff barriers was achieved in 1968. The Single European Act was signed in 1986 to 
establish a Single European Market by 1992, by removing the barriers to free movement of capital, labour, goods and 
services.  
39
 Declaration on the AEC Blueprint, supra note 37, paragraph 1. 
40
 Michael Ewing-Chow, “Culture Club or Chameleon: Should ASEAN Adopt Legalization for Economic Integration?” 
(2008) 12 SYBIL 225 at 228. 
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Absent in many of the ASEAN documents is any reference to liberalism or the democratic peace 
theory that was present in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. No ASEAN document contains a 
statement similar to the Schuman Declaration that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was created to establish a solidarity in production so that “any war… becomes not merely 
unthinkable, but materially impossible”.41 The intention was to pool, through the transfer of 
sovereignty, the key strategic sectors – coal and steel – making it impossible for any member 
state to use these resources for rearmament, though it did indirectly lead to a more integrated 
production base in Europe.
42
 
This absence of any clear enunciated goal of ASEAN Integration is perhaps the main reason why 
trying to understand the project is akin to that of blind men trying to understand the shape of an 
elephant. It has developed without a unifying thesis and in different stages so that an observer looking 
at these aspects would come to understand ASEAN only from those compartmentalised experiences.  
We do not attempt to develop a theory that explains all the various past and present aspects of the 
ASEAN Integration project holistically but rather are content to provide a theory for the main thrust of 
the ASEAN Integration project as it stands today. As stated above, we develop our thesis on the 
assumption that each of the ASEAN member states prioritises self-interest or enlightened self-interest 
in the project similar to members of the early European endeavours. 
The key to ASEAN Integration: The Integrated Production Network (IPN) 
Unfortunately, unlike the clear benefits a Single Market brought to Europe, the benefits for ASEAN 
are more complex and less obvious. While the combined population of ASEAN at approximately 600 
million
43
 compares favourably with that of EU’s 500 million44, the combined GDP of ASEAN is only 
US$1.8 trillion
45
 compared to EU’s US$16.3 trillion46. Thus, any impressionistic understanding of 
ASEAN revolving around the value of a marketplace for ASEAN goods will have to be moderated by 
the short term realities that the consumers in ASEAN at the moment are not wealthy enough to buy 
many of the goods and intra-ASEAN trade – which on average comprises one quarter of the total 
annual ASEAN trade
47
 (as compared to intra-EC trade which comprised nearly half of members’ 
trading activity from 1958-1972)
48
 – is currently not a driving force in ASEAN Integration. 
We think that the main driver of ASEAN integration therefore is the integrated production network 
(IPN).  
An IPN is a network of enterprises that have chosen to link their production based upon cost-
effectiveness to the extent that standing outside the network becomes no longer viable. The IPN can be 
horizontal or vertical. When an IPN becomes transnational, it faces several challenges. The main 
challenge beyond the cost of transport and logistics planning is ensuring that the rules applicable to 
each actor in the network remain predictable and certain. Where the IPN operates in countries where 
                                                     
41
 Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-
declaration/index_en.htm 
42
 See Heribert Dieter, “Transnational Production Networks in the Automobile Industry”, (Notre Europe, 2007) Study 
No.58, at http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud58_01.pdf. 
43
 ASEAN Community in Figures 2011, at http://www.asean.org/documents/ASEAN%20community%20in%20figures.pdf, 
at 1. 
44
 Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook 2011, at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-11-
001/EN/KS-CD-11-001-EN.PDF, at 109. 
45
 Supra note 43 at 4. 
46
 Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, International Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org. 
47
 Supra note 43 at 9. 
48
 European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series No. 40, Dec 2005, at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp40.pdf. 
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the rule of law is weaker, guarantees against arbitrary intervention and discrimination become more 
critical for the continued effective functioning of the IPN.  
The automotive industry is frequently put forward as one of the best examples of IPN in Europe 
and that may well be true. Direct production of cars account for 2.2 million jobs, but on top of that 
comes 9.8 million jobs in closely related sectors. Even countries like Denmark (7000 jobs) and 
Finland (6000 jobs) without any kind of automotive industry reap job benefits from the IPN.
 49
 
Thus, the economic integration of ASEAN is not necessarily about the development of a Single 
Market but rather the development of an IPN but that is not the whole story. While the creation of the 
European Single Market indirectly created the environment for new networks of businesses and 
production, in Asia, counter intuitively, these networks already exist despite some trade barriers. 
Rather than changing the general environment to allow a climate for such networks, Asian businesses 
took advantage of the less than transparent discretion provided to policy makers at all levels in many 
Asian countries to obtain specific solutions to the trade barriers they faced. 
Hence, since the 1960s, subject to the changing players and gravitational forces, much of intra-Asia 
trade is the trade of components which is part of a production chain of “Factory Asia”. That is to say, 
each state is part of a process that culminates in a final product for export to developed countries.
50
 
ASEAN because of its low labour cost and high raw material endowment has always been the hub of 
such a “Factory Asia” network. Thus, unrestricted regional trade is “an important building bloc for the 
region’s economic strength, and consequently disruptions – whether political or administrative – puts 
this competitiveness at risk.”51  
Dieter writing about the development of the automotive market in Europe points out that “without 
the creation of a single regulatory sphere, the integration processes could not have taken place.”52 He 
suggests that the expansion of the EU itself enlarged the space for business while the PANEURO 
scheme (that allowed for the cumulation of origin) increased the area available for sourcing of 
components without having to consider the local content requires of the EU.
53
 By contrast, writing in 
2006, Baldwin characterised East Asian regionalism as being “a mess” in that while there is a high 
level of regional division of labour in the production process, there has been limited legalisation of the 
process.
54
 He suggested that the problem with “Factory Asia” was not a plan but the management of 
the plan highlighting that the unilateral tariff-cutting that created “Factory Asia” is not subject to WTO 
discipline (bindings) or any alternative legal disciplines.
55
 
Indeed, production integration in Asia has been more a bottom-up process than a top-down one. 
Abo called this process “spontaneous integration”56 which perhaps may also be described as the de 
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facto regionalisation identified by Higgott.
57
 This has resulted in a business environment which is less 
transparent and less certain than that of Europe but one which is no less productive. Dieter shows that 
the production of automobiles and electronics in East Asia is relatively integrated in practice but is 
facing the headwinds of protectionism and inconsistent governmental policies.
58
 He also describes the 
responsiveness to the problems and illustrates that by way of the replacement of the Brand-to-Brand 
Complementation (BBC) scheme adopted by ASEAN countries in 1988 with the ASEAN Industrial 
Co-operation (AICO) scheme in 1995. Notably, AICO has broadened the scope of ASEAN 
cooperation beyond automobile parts and has also finally included Indonesia in the regime.
59
  
Having studied AICO in some detail, Sim notes:
60
  
AICO was created in 1996 to encourage cross border investment and trade within ASEAN, serving 
as an early harvest of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, which in 2010 became the ASEAN 
Trade in Goods Agreement, or ATIGA). Companies operating in two or more ASEAN member 
states could qualify for the early application of the 0-5% AFTA rates for their production inputs 
and finished goods if they could demonstrate that the proposal involved resource sharing/pooling 
and/or industrial complementation. The inputs and outputs also had to have 40% ASEAN content. 
After approval of the AICO application, the ASEAN Secretariat would issue an AICO certificate 
of eligibility which would allow the company to enter goods from the other ASEAN member 
using the reduced AFTA rates. This AICO certificate thereby created a set of rights and 
expectations between the company and the ASEAN Secretariat.  
As almost all of the approved AICO projects – 89 out of 129 – involved the automotive industry 
(because Japanese companies used the AICO scheme to enjoy major cost savings from the reduced 
import duties), we shall use it as a case study here.  
With the full implementation of AFTA/ATIGA in 2010, Sim highlighted that the tariff reductions 
had reached their final level. The reduced tariff rates under AICO were now equivalent – or in 
some cases a little higher – to the AFTA/ATIGA rate. This meant that that using AICO no longer 
offered any practical advantage over using ATIGA.
61
 However, Thailand continued to apply 
AICO, particularly for the importation of complete knocked-down (CKD) automobiles from other 
ASEAN member states. This arguably was inconsistent with the requirements of ATIGA – no 
import quotas were to be imposed on intra-ASEAN trade in goods. However, after several months 
of internal pressure and ASEAN-style consensus building, Thailand agreed with other ASEAN 
members to terminate AICO and allow it to become superseded by ATIGA.
62
 
Therefore, as exemplified by the above, if Factory Asia already exists, what real gains may be 
provided by ASEAN Integration? We posit that ASEAN Integration may provide two core benefits for 
ASEAN member states.  
First, the codification and legalisation of existing policies to facilitate the IPN will provide comfort 
and security to many of the MNCs investing in this region. An IPN cannot develop without the inflow 
of investment capital. The ASEAN member states are cognizant of this and this desire to protect 
investments (including intra-ASEAN investments) is clearly stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the 2009 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). Here, ASEAN has proclaimed it intends to 
“create a liberal, facilitative, transparent and competitive investment environment in ASEAN” as well 
as to improve “transparency and predictability of investment rules, regulations and procedures 
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conducive to increased investment among member states.”63 Generally, ACIA builds on ASEAN’s 
two previous investment agreements – the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments and the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area – and governs 
the international investment regime among the member states.  
After solidifying the international investment regime among ASEAN member states through 
ACIA, the ASEAN member states also signed three other agreements related to investment in 2009. 
These were, namely, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), which 
includes a chapter dedicated to investment on 27 February 2009 and the Agreements on Investment 
under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation with the Republic of 
Korea and the People’s Republic of China (AKIA and ACFTA) on 2 June 2009 and 15 August 2009 
respectively.  
All of these agreements provide for the first time a clarity regarding which investments would be 
protected, how future investments might apply for such protections, and a binding dispute settlement 
system for investors to bring a claim against a state. Investment agreements like these will codify and 
regularise existing understandings between investors and the relevant governments as well as constrain 
new governments from changing policies overnight. This should provide an extra incentive for MNCs 
to invest in the ASEAN IPN and ensure that changes in governments do not unduly affect the 
production network. 
Second, while some ASEAN member states have been successful in the past at picking which 
industries to focus on, the rapidly evolving global marketplace will make such forecasting increasingly 
difficult. At the same time, many of the incumbent governments in ASEAN have embraced more 
democratic processes. This means that the power to make autocratic choices for economic 
development will diminish over time. The fall of Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, and 
more recently, Thaksin in Thailand; the reduced parliamentary majorities of the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) in Singapore and the Barisan Nasional (BN) and United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) in Malaysia; and the decision of the military junta in Myanmar to allow elections, all suggest 
that centralised choices about which industries to favour will not only become more difficult but may 
not be possible for ASEAN governments in the future.  
Thus, by creating an environment conducive to an IPN, ASEAN States may be able to focus on 
macro-economic policies while allowing more private enterprise influences over their industrial 
development. This, as Porter suggests, is often a more successful way of developing industrial policy 
and frees ASEAN governments from having to make successful choices (which as Porter suggests 
they are less well placed to do than private business) to support their perception of legitimacy by their 
electorate
64
. 
Will such a laissez-faire business environment really develop in ASEAN? Perhaps just as ASEAN 
Integration is integration but not as we previously understood it from the European experience, a free 
business environment in ASEAN will likely have a flavour unfamiliar to that of the West. The Four 
Freedoms of Europe – the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital – while echoed in the 
AEC Blueprint, have been textually modified into “free movement of goods, services, skilled labour, 
and freer movement of capital”.65 The fact that even the Four Freedoms of Europe are not unfettered 
by regulations and standards highlights the semiotic difference between Europe and ASEAN. The 
narrative told to ASEAN citizens is not the European ideal of an “ever closer union among the peoples 
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of Europe” – one of the stated aims of the Treaty of Rome and repeated in the Maastricht Treaty. This 
aspiration of bringing the peoples of ASEAN together is not echoed in any form in any ASEAN 
documents. Instead, the main promise seems to be voluntary cooperation leading to economic 
development without significant cost.
66
  
One may be forgiven for thinking that the major issues that have political ramifications would be 
naturally subject to agreement on a case-by-case basis but that technical issues may often be left to a 
non-political coordinating body. While it is difficult to categorise each issue as political or technical, it 
should be noted that even the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
67
 provides flexibilities which allow members to 
withdraw tariff concessions which they would otherwise be obligated to grant. This is pursuant to the 
2000 Protocol Regarding the Implementation of the CEPT Scheme Temporary Exclusion List (“2000 
CEPT Protocol”)68 which declares that in order to provide flexibility,69 it allows ASEAN member 
states to withdraw tariff commitments which have already been agreed upon under the liberalisation 
scheme.
70
 The 2000 CEPT Protocol was a response to Malaysia’s withdrawal of automobiles and 
completely knocked down automobile kits from AFTA tariff reductions it had previously agreed upon 
in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis.
71
 Some commentators have suggested that as only the 
products under the CEPT Inclusion List are subject to liberalisation, it should be noted that this means 
that specific tariff lines may be kept out of the Inclusion List interminably.
72
 Nonetheless, Article 6 of 
2000 CEPT Protocol allows for the suspension of equivalent concessions by an affected ASEAN 
member state in the case of a non-agreement situation. This thus provides for some economic cost 
disincentives as well as a political one. 
The practice of flexibility in ASEAN relations is well-ingrained from the time of ASEAN’s 
establishment. Beginning with the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN leaders made the deliberate 
choice to steer clear of binding legal obligations to allow for more flexible engagement. The Bangkok 
Declaration itself is only a political statement (as opposed to a legal document) that required no 
ratification.
73
 The ASEAN founding fathers wanted it to be an organisation with minimal legal 
institutionalisation. This was because ASEAN was first and foremost a diplomatic instrument for 
confidence-building at a time when their common concern was the containment of communist China.
74
 
This emphasis on flexibility continues to permeate how ASEAN Integration is to proceed. 
With that said, the cognitive process of confidence-building in ASEAN has begun. ASEAN 
member states are increasingly subjecting themselves to obligations in regional agreements and many 
of them are more vocal about announcing their intentions to adhere to a greater rule of law. A business 
environment conducive to all Western investors will be unlikely in the near future but a business 
environment that codifies and regularises current IPNs, provides for greater transparency in 
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governmental discretion for investments while binding ASEAN States to a dispute settlement process 
may be sufficient to promote the future development of the IPN in ASEAN for now.  
ASEAN Plus: Broadening Asian economic cooperation  
It must be pointed out that the ASEAN IPN is not a purely intra-ASEAN phenomenon. It is an Asian 
one and in some cases even a global one. 
The 2011 WTO IDE-JETRO publication on “Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in Asia” 
describes how in 1985 there were only four major trade in goods players in the Asian region; Japan, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Resource-rich states Malaysia and Indonesia would supply 
resources to Japan while Singapore manufactured component parts for assembly in Japan which would 
then be exported to the West. In 1990, the number of key players increased with Korea, Thailand, and 
Chinese Taipei, all newly industrialised economies, joining the supply chain. Around 1995, Japan 
started to supply its intermediate/intermediary products to the newly industrialised developing states. 
This led to the creation of strong linkages in core suppliers of Japan and their affiliates. While there 
was a strong linkage between Asian states with a high level of technological transformation, the level 
of technological development was low. The high product flow was attributed more to supply than 
value addition especially between Singapore and Malaysia. 
The gravitational forces changed when in 2001 China joined the WTO and began to access Japan’s 
current supply chain of component parts. By 2005, the centre of gravity had shifted to China, with it 
being the main market for all intermediary products from the Asian region. The competitiveness of 
China’s export is not only attributable to its cheap labour but also to the intermediary high quality 
goods/products it receives from the other Asian states (and in particular ASEAN states) in the supply 
chain structure. ASEAN states today produce parts/accessories and components and exports them to 
China which, copying the previously successful Japanese model, then assembles the products and 
exports the finished products principally to the West.  
This historical account of the Asian supply chain brings into question the previous suggestion that 
ASEAN Integration should be understood to be about Production Integration rather than Market 
Integration. If ASEAN is only a link in the chain that led previously to Japan and now leads more to 
China, can Production Integration in ASEAN really be understood separate from the production chains 
of the rest of Asia? At the same time, the very narrative of ASEAN Integration has been largely 
fuelled by the dismay of ASEAN States at the FDI flowing away from ASEAN towards China (as it is 
arguably large enough to be an integrated production base). This apparent paradox of cooperation with 
China in production but in competition with China for foreign investment deserves some unpacking. 
The explanation may lie in a neo-classical analysis of the comparative and competitive advantages 
of each Asian state. China has a low cost and relatively high productive labour force but limited 
natural resource endowments. Many ASEAN states, conversely, have high natural resource 
endowments. Others, like Singapore, have technological advantages over China. Despite the size of 
China, it makes sense for manufacturers to outsource the production of natural resource-intensive 
goods to some ASEAN states with the relevant advantages and precision-engineered high technology 
goods to other ASEAN states. At the same time, the strength of extant trade networks (both legal and 
commercial) also favour the use of hubs like Singapore to provide strategic trade, logistical, and tax 
advantages when planning the production chain.  
Indeed, the focus in ASEAN on the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Korea, and Japan) relationship 
underscores the point that ASEAN Integration cannot be understood as separate from Asian economic 
integration. It is still about Production Integration but not limited only to ASEAN. It is still not about 
Market Integration as the Plus Three countries still maintain a certain level of protectionist tariffs for 
manufactured goods and at the same time keenly support the development of supply chains and 
production networks for the manufacture of goods to export to the West. 
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The ASEAN Plus Three countries – China, Korea, and Japan – generally tend to prefer a regional 
free trade agreement with their ASEAN counterparts as opposed to individual free trade agreements 
with each ASEAN state. The ASEAN-China agreement entered into force in 2007 and the ASEAN-
Korea and ASEAN-Japan agreements entered into force in 2009. There are, however, two major 
exceptions to this generalization.  
First, each of the Plus Three countries pursued individual free trade agreements with Singapore. 
The China-Singapore agreement entered into force in 2009 while the Korea-Singapore agreement 
entered into force in 2006 and the Japan-Singapore agreement in 2002. Singapore is one of the most 
open economies in the world and it has a vast free trade agreement network.  
The second noteworthy example is Japan. Before entering into the Japan-ASEAN agreement, Japan 
pursued individual free trade agreements with a majority of the ASEAN states. This policy may be 
attributed to Japan’s historical presence in Southeast Asia that dates back to the 1960s. After its first 
FTA with Singapore (2002), Japan attempted to solidify its ASEAN position before negotiating a 
regional agreement with ASEAN countries in toto.
75
 Japan subsequently signed Free Trade 
Agreements with Indonesia (2008), Malaysia (2006), Philippines (2008), Thailand (2007), and 
Vietnam (2009).
76
  
Interestingly, neither the US nor the EU has concluded a free trade agreement with ASEAN. The 
US has instead initially pursued a bilateral approach starting with the US-Singapore FTA in 2002.
77
 Its 
successive individual negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand, however, were delayed and suspended 
as a result of political and other issues.
78
 Currently, the US is working with ASEAN under the 2006 
US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
79
 while engaging with multiple ASEAN 
countries (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam) through the negotiations of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement showing a preference for the group approach.
80
 The EU is following a 
similar strategy negotiating individual free trade agreements with Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam.
8182
  
Some speculate that the ASEAN countries prefer to negotiate as a single entity to take advantage of 
greater negotiating leverage vis-à-vis the larger countries such as China, Korea, Japan, and the United 
States. Others have noted, however, that even though the presumption is that ASEAN will negotiate as 
a bloc, it has not always occurred in this manner when negotiating with third parties.
83
 Although 
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negotiating with the ASEAN countries as a whole may be more attractive, sometimes the political 
realities dictate otherwise. 
Just as Singapore was the hub for the ASEAN region, the development of the AEC coupled with 
the evolving Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) ASEAN has negotiated with the Plus Three countries 
suggests that ASEAN is trying to position itself as a hub for Asia. This is a strategy that some have 
suggested is also based on the perception that the Plus Three countries harbour deep historical distrust 
of each other and would prefer a neutral intermediary in their supply chains. Indeed, while there have 
been sporadic discussions about a North East Asian FTA (“East Asia FTA”) between the Plus Three 
countries, there has been limited progress and the focus of Japan has recently shifted towards the 
Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). This also does not consider the obvious 
competitive and comparative advantages that ASEAN possesses such as high natural resource 
endowment, a relatively (in the case of Korea and Japan) cheaper labour force and good logistical 
networks.  
The fragmentation of production and the rise of successful hub-spoke models of trade together with 
the increased reliance by manufacturers of supply chains have resulted in the creation of extant Asian 
IPNs. With that said, the current competitive and comparative advantages should not lull ASEAN into 
a sense of security of its place in the Asian production chain. China is actively sourcing natural 
resources in Africa and Latin America while Korea is expanding its production strategies to reach 
beyond Asia. Thus, ASEAN Integration can be understood not just as a way of making the region 
more attractive to investment from Western MNCs but also a way of continuing to provide value to 
the Asian production chains that are linked to the region. If so, then enhancements to the value of 
ASEAN as a regional hub must be found in the gains from the development of greater efficiencies, 
predictability and coordination that ASEAN Integration promises. If this does not occur, it may well 
be that the competitive and comparative advantages elsewhere may cause the Asian production chains 
to shift their focus. 
Where is there room for improvement? For manufactured goods which are part of existing 
production chains, the tariffs in ASEAN are already relatively low.
84
 The barriers that are faced are not 
necessary border measures but behind the border regulations. Investment regulations, trade in services 
rules, and product safety standards if harmonised will increase the attractiveness of ASEAN, not 
perhaps as a custom union but rather a regulatory union that facilitates production and investment. 
While there is some development in ASEAN on this front,
85
 the Single Market of ASEAN, as stated 
above, is not understood by ASEAN member states as being similar to the Common Market of 
Europe. The improbability of a custom union will mean that there will be little internal impetus for the 
creation of harmonized common policies (which are expensive and complicated to negotiate) and there 
is even less desire to share the individual benefits that each ASEAN member obtains from the Single 
Market with each other. Instead, it may well be that the focus of ASEAN Integration may be more in 
the realm of coordination and branding of the extant IPN while creating more comfort and security for 
investors involved in that IPN by increasing the role and rule of law in ASEAN. 
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II. From the spirit of the times to structuring for integration 
ASEAN zeitgeist: Fear, survival, and global relevance
86
 
What then can we distil from the foregoing narrative and discussion to enable us to understand 
ASEAN Integration better? A running theme throughout the evolution of ASEAN Integration since its 
creation in 1967 is the sense of fear and uncertainty by ASEAN states about their future and about 
each other. It is not so much an existential insecurity that often marks the debates about Europe but 
rather one more rooted in the poverty and chaos of the past; it is more focused not on understanding 
one’s place in the world as much as simply on survival.  
It has always been priority for ASEAN member states to avoid being irrelevant in the international 
order. They have been strenuously convincing themselves and the outside world that the region and its 
effort to integrate was a serious and worthwhile attempt to enhance conditions for economic prosperity 
and political survival, both domestically and externally. However, today, it is not survival in the sense 
of where is the next meal coming from. Many ASEAN members (with the exception of perhaps 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) have progressed beyond that. Yet, even rich members like Malaysia 
and Singapore, often worry about the drying up of trade growth and a reduction in the standard of 
living. Until recently, this was not the conversation in Europe. Conversely, the remembrance of a time 
of scarcity is often at the forefront of the consciousness of most ASEAN member states. For example, 
the GDP per capita of Singapore at the time of its independence and then separation from Malaysia in 
1965 was US$516 which has since increased approximately 100 times to US$50,123 in 2011.
87
 The 
fear is that if growth was that fast, perhaps a change in the environment could lead to a precipitous 
fall. 
ASEAN has had to face significant changes in its internal environment since the 1960s and even 
more changes in its external environment. The consolidation of nation states that continued in this 
post-war, post-independence period was challenged by deep-seated inter-ethnic tensions, struggles 
between political factions, separatist movements, and transitions from monarchy to constitutionalism. 
These tensions also affected Thailand even if it was not coming out of colonialism. Between states, 
relations moved from a fear of each other during the Konfrontasi in the 1960s, to a fear of outside 
threats to peace and security in the form of the Vietnam War and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 
1970s, to fearing a complete economic meltdown in the form of the Asian Financial Crisis that 
resulted in severe social and political upheavals in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in the late 1990s. 
Just as it was recovering from that Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN faced the challenge of the rise of 
China (and to a lesser extent, India) as a major competitor for FDI. In all of these situations, ASEAN 
has always had to react, adapt, and readjust. 
Initially a confidence-building exercise, ASEAN Integration today is about providing certainty as it 
seeks to improve its attractiveness as a link in an Asian IPN. Where previously the role of law in 
ASEAN and its emphasis on the ASEAN Way as a mechanism for confidence-building was critical, at 
least textually today, ASEAN aspires towards a greater role for the rule of law governing the 
relationship between its members. The 2007 ASEAN Charter declared that ASEAN’s new self-
understanding was that it would recognise clear and binding obligations, rules for dispute settlement, 
and sanctions for breaches of such rules (at least in economic matters). As ASEAN now endeavours to 
attract FDI from the West as well as Asia as both an production base in itself as well as part of the 
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larger Asian IPN, ASEAN has textually accepted that it must be perceived by itself and the world as 
an integration project where prior agreed bargains stick and the rule of law is observed.
88
  
However, herein lies the chasm between aspiration and execution of the ASEAN Integration vision. 
We know where ASEAN wants to go and why it wants to get there. The most difficult question for 
ASEAN to answer is how it should get there. It hopes to do so with ambitious treaty texts and very 
little else — domestic courts in many ASEAN members are weak with underdeveloped human capital, 
no ASEAN supranational adjudication body has been proposed, and the ASEAN Secretariat remains 
severely underfunded.
89
  
Without such infrastructure, what then can propel ASEAN Integration? While we are not 
proponents of institutional path dependency, the absence of coordinating institutions for an integration 
project that is very much about coordinating, codifying, and regularising existing production networks 
should be a matter of high concern for ASEAN. In this respect, it is imperative that ASEAN sets in 
place core infrastructure to reach its goal of regional integration – namely, institutions, legalisation, 
and dispute settlement mechanisms.  
ASEAN Institutions: Intergovernmental or Supranational? 
For deeper regional integration to take place, it also is important to enhance coordination among new 
and existing ASEAN institutions and to facilitate the interpretation and enforcement of ASEAN 
decisions. What then are the modes of institutions we should be considering in the ASEAN Integration 
context?  
Huntington’s theory on institutions has been described as simply “institutions are absorbers of 
conflicts”.90 In this respect it is interesting to note the small role institutions have played in forging 
ASEAN. We can go so far as to say that, except for most recent years, institutions have been absent. 
To counter this, the ASEAN Charter established and formalised a number of regional organs to enable 
ASEAN to develop the ASEAN Community, such as the ASEAN Summit (Article 7); ASEAN 
Coordinating Council (Article 8); ASEAN Community Councils, which consist of the Political-
Security Council, the Economic Community Council and the Socio-Cultural Community Council 
(Article 9); and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Article 14).  
The ASEAN Charter also established a Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR). The CPR 
comprises delegates that are appointed by each ASEAN member state to ASEAN. These 
representatives hold the rank of Ambassador and are based in Jakarta. However, the CPR will not be 
the primary decision-making body. Instead, the ASEAN Summit will continue to be the main forum 
for decision-making and decisions at all levels will continue to be made by consultation and 
consensus.  
Moreover, the Charter also expands the role and function of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN 
Secretariat to enable them to play a more substantive role, including to facilitate and to monitor the 
progress of the implementation of ASEAN agreements and decisions towards the realisation of an 
ASEAN community. Article 11(2) of the Charter makes it clear that one of the function of the 
Secretary-General is to improve ASEAN’s compliance to ASEAN agreements, and in light of this 
function, the Charter accorded the Secretary-General ministerial status.  
While the ASEAN Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat have been given greater 
responsibility to monitor compliance and facilitate the implementation of the ASEAN agreements, the 
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budget for the ASEAN Secretariat remains very tight. In the 2011 financial year, the ASEAN 
Secretariat was given US$15.76 million with each member state contributing equally to the budget. 
This insistence on equal contributions means that the annual budget of the Secretariat is limited by the 
amount that the less developed ASEAN member state may be willing to contribute. This will continue 
to keep the ASEAN Secretariat budget tight as some the ASEAN members, being Least Developed 
Countries, may find it more difficult to increase their contributions. Indeed, in very practical terms, the 
very limited budget that ASEAN enjoys will likely limit its effectiveness as a legally separate entity 
from its members for all the clarity that legal personality has provided. 
All these organs were intended to provide ASEAN with the institutional framework to improve the 
member states adherence to ASEAN agreements and commitments. However, the Charter provides 
few details on the roles of these organs and how they relate with each other. Take the ASEAN 
Summit, for example. Article 7 establishes the ASEAN Summit as “the supreme policy-making body 
of ASEAN” comprising of the “Heads of State or Government of the member states”. That is to say, 
the highest level of decision-making in ASEAN is an intergovernmental one. One of the tasks of the 
ASEAN Summit is to “decide on matters referred to it under Chapters VII”, which touches on 
decision-making within ASEAN. Chapter VII confirms that the ASEAN Way of consultation and 
consensus will remain a basic principle of decision-making in ASEAN, whereupon the ASEAN 
Summit comes into the picture only when a consensus cannot be reached.
91
 In this situation, the 
ASEAN Summit “may decide how a specific decision can be made”.92 
An examination of Article 7, however, reveals that there is scant information on how the ASEAN 
Summit is to arrive at specific decisions in the event of non-consensus. The provision, whilst 
empowering the ASEAN Summit to “decide on matters referred to it under Chapter VII”, does not 
clarify whether decisions by the ASEAN Summit have to be reached via unanimous consensus or 
voting. If unanimous consensus is required, there is no information in the provision indicating what is 
to happen to a matter referred to the ASEAN Summit under Chapter VII if the ASEAN Summit is 
unable to reach a consensus. In this regard, the Charter perhaps missed an opportunity to prescribe 
mechanisms for effective decision-making that is necessary for successful economic integration. It 
may well have been that the political realities made such silence a necessity. 
Another possible reason of why the ASEAN Charter does not elaborate the roles of these organs in 
details, is probably because the Charter was meant to be a general all-encompassing document, 
without having to deal with the technical details of each provisions. Indeed, Article 49 of the Charter 
actually empowers the ASEAN Coordinating Council to issue the terms of reference and rules of 
procedure for ASEAN. This would also make it easier to review and amend each of the terms of 
reference and rules of procedure separately without having to amend the ASEAN Charter.  
ASEAN has thus far concluded the Rules of Procedure for the Conclusion of International 
Agreements by ASEAN, Rules of Procedure for the Interpretation of the ASEAN Charter, Rules of 
Procedure of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Rules of Authorisation for Legal 
Transactions under Domestic Laws, and Rules of Reference of Non-Compliance to the ASEAN 
Summit. It is still in the process of finalising the ASEAN Secretariat Staff Regulations. These terms of 
reference and rules of procedure are all aimed to establish clear, transparent, and efficient working 
relationships between the ASEAN Organs. However, it is unclear as to the degree that these rules of 
procedure are being adhered to.  
Therefore, if ASEAN institutions either do not currently exist or are not strong enough, could 
domestic institutions such as the municipal courts be resorted to?  
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The European experience reveals an evolution of its legal system in which the domestic courts of 
each member state were integral to its development towards greater legalism. This was however not 
the result of political will (at least initially) but an autochthonous development of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) which transpired from its desire to build its own legitimacy and its vision of European 
Integration (which was in fact in direct conflict with the will of member states). As mentioned above, 
the ECJ managed to push its vision of European legalisation using the preliminary ruling mechanism 
in Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, which greatly promoted member states’ compliance with 
European law by making them subject to binding decisions from their own domestic courts.  
The national courts of each EU member state became willing enlistees of the ECJ’s 
constitutionalism doctrine. They actively used the preliminary ruling system to their advantage as it 
provided them the opportunity to escape their national hierarchies and to bolster their independence 
and authority vis-à-vis other higher courts and political bodies.
93
 By referencing cases to the ECJ, the 
national courts were also enforcing European law and contributing to the process of European 
Integration. 
The unique legal mechanisms existing in the European system that allowed domestic courts to 
successfully contribute to the legalisation of Europe process, however, would be difficult to replicate 
in ASEAN. First of all, ASEAN does not have any form of supranational court that can push domestic 
courts to enforce ASEAN law. Second of all, studies have shown that domestic courts in most ASEAN 
countries are not sufficiently strong enough both in terms of human capital or political capital to be 
absorbers of conflict. 
Alternatively, could international institutions fill the gap? Alvarez argues that that the region’s 
participation in non-binding institutions is not necessarily inconsistent with legal regimes because 
these alternatives to institutionalisation often work in tandem with or under the shadow of formal 
international organisations.
94
 While this may be true for the areas under the umbra of those 
international organisations, does not provide comfort for the areas in the grey penumbra or in the areas 
outside the shadow itself. For example, if there are insufficient overlaps such as when ASEAN enters 
into internal WTO plus trade agreement like AFTA that provide for disciplines beyond those subject 
to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the global institutional supply may prove insufficient to 
resolve a dispute.  
While ASEAN may have done so for disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
ASEAN economic agreements by agreeing in the Charter that these would be settled in accordance 
with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM),
95
 which provides for 
a negative consensus rule for the adoption of any report,
96
 this system has not yet been activated 
despite it being available since 1996. The system adopted under the EDSM follows the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
albeit with even shorter timelines. Although this mechanism have never been invoked, it is interesting 
to note that Singapore in 1995 (pre-dating the EDSM) and the Philippines in 2008 (post EDSM) have 
preferred to invoke the WTO dispute settlement mechanism against other ASEAN countries (Malaysia 
and Thailand, respectively) rather than use existing ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms. Although 
it is worth to note that Singapore claim against Malaysia pre-dates the EDSM (Singapore lodged the 
complaint to WTO in 1995, prior to the 1996 Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism). 
This suggests that ASEAN members themselves trust the multilateral WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism more than the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms as an absorber of conflict.  
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Keeping regulations and policies transparent is a fundamental condition of international trade. As 
mentioned earlier, ASEAN intends to “create a liberal, facilitative, transparent and competitive 
investment environment in ASEAN” as well as to improve “transparency and predictability of 
investment rules, regulations and procedures conducive to increased investment among member 
states”. 97  
In the WTO, surveillance of national trade policies is a fundamentally important activity running 
throughout the work of the WTO. At the centre of this work is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM). The main objective of the TPRM is facilitating the smooth functioning of the multilateral 
trading system by enhancing the transparency of Members’ trade policies.98 Nevertheless, there is no 
policy review mechanism within ASEAN. It is submitted that the TPRM may be a viable tool to 
facilitate trade and absorb conflicts among ASEAN members. ASEAN can consider setting up an 
equivalent trade policy review body as that of the WTO to carry out reviews on policies and practices 
of goods trade, services, and intellectual property within ASEAN. Setting up a TPRM within ASEAN 
will increase the transparency and understanding of members’ trade policies and practices. 
Specifically, regular monitoring of each member’s trade policies and examining trade policymaking 
institutions and the macroeconomic situation of each member would inevitably impose normative 
pressures to the members. Thus each member would arguably be more active in achieving a high 
standard of self-compliance. Also, the TPRM would function as an ex ante mechanism to prevent 
trade conflicts among members. In particular, by making trade policies transparent and by attending 
public and intergovernmental debate on different issues, it is easier for members to understand each 
other’s trade policies and practices and their national concerns behind. 
Nonetheless, setting a TPRM would require substantial costs and effort from ASEAN member 
states in that it requires comprehensive procedural and technical support from each state. The staff 
capacity and financial resources of the TPRM would also affect the effectiveness of the function of 
TPRM.  
Moreover, whether the TPRM will have a significant impact on the behaviour of ASEAN members 
depends largely on each member’s self-adherence to the established policies and measures. And 
whether a member would respond positively to the TPRM also depends on its domestic circumstances 
and policy priorities. Therefore, when preparing the establishment of the TPRM within ASEAN, we 
will have to take into account each member’s economic conditions, their wider economic and 
developmental needs, their policies and objectives, and the external economic environment that they 
face. 
However, the institutionalisation of the new ASEAN Charter
99
 raises the question of whether 
ASEAN is changing culturally towards a more legalised basis for its intra-ASEAN international 
relationships and if this is an effective strategy for decision-making and greater integration within the 
region. It must be noted, however, that we feel that the dichotomy between Intergovernmental and 
Supranational decision-making institutions is false. In the case of ASEAN (as is elsewhere), it is more 
about having good rather than bad (or non-extant) institutions such that decisions can be made 
effectively to promote regional integration.  
ASEAN Legalisation 
In addition to ASEAN Institution-building, legalisation is another important cornerstone for ASEAN 
Integration. Some have suggested that what ASEAN needs to look towards are some of the rules-based 
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principles (though not necessarily adopt the exact practices) of the EU.
100
 This echoes the literature on 
legalisation. In particular, Legalisation as a concept in international relations was developed by the 
authors of the Legalization Issue of the journal, International Organization, to explain “the use and 
consequences of law in international politics”.101 Referring to the characteristics that institutions may 
possess, they Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter have conceptualised the elements of 
legalisation as obligation, precision, and delegation.
102
 While other conceptions of legalisation exist, it 
is useful to adopt this as a perspective in which to analyse ASEAN from a descriptive methodology 
rather than a normative agenda. 
Obligation refers to international actors being legally bound by legal rules and procedures, whether 
international or domestic. Such legal rules and procedures impose obligations that are distinct from 
obligations resulting from coercion, comity, and morality.
103
 Precision means that these rules and 
procedures define rights and obligations in unambiguous ways.
104
 That is, the scope of reasonably 
interpreting them is narrow. In Franck’s parlance, this means that such rules are determinate.105 
Finally, delegation relates to the grant of authority to third parties, such as courts, arbitrators, and 
administrative bodies, to interpret and apply rules during dispute settlement and also to make further 
rules.
106
 Dispute resolution mechanisms are highly legalised when parties agree, on the basis of clear 
and generally applicable rules, to be bound by the decisions of these third parties. They are less 
legalised when political bargaining goes on and parties are not bound to accept the determinations of 
third party adjudication.
107
  
The authors in the International Organization issue on Legalisation in 2000 postulate that 
institutions exhibit each of these elements along a continuum, ranging from the weakest (the complete 
absence of obligation, precision, and delegation) to the strongest form. They caution that it was 
difficult to draw a strict dichotomy between various types of international legalisation and that it was 
probably not instructive to say that a form of legalisation is inherently superior to other forms. Indeed, 
they take pains to clarify that the range of soft law types in the middle rows may be more applicable in 
certain circumstances than the hard law types.
108
 Nonetheless, it should be noted that ASEAN was 
classified as having weak legalisation whereas the EU was seen as having strong legalisation.
109
 
In that issue, Kahler argued, however, that Asia’s choice on the degree of legalisation was 
instrumental and strategic and it did not reflect any deeper cultural preference.
110
 Writing in the midst 
of economic reforms after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, he opined that although the crisis promotes 
institutional change, more legalisation may not offer solutions to the economic challenges faced by the 
region. Further, Kahler argued that as Asian economies are already globally engaged, global 
institutional supply may prove adequate for Asia’s circumstances without the need for the region to 
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legalise more by developing its own institutions.
111
 It is submitted that this may or may not be true 
depending on whether there are sufficient overlaps in the institutions ability to deal with the needs 
arising from further economic integration in Asia and a study of these interactions should probably be 
undertaken. It is not within the scope of this paper to do so.  
Kahler also suggested that in order to understand how the ASEAN legal framework is developing, 
it is necessary to appreciate how ASEAN has been operating by the ASEAN Way. For more than 40 
years, ASEAN has functioned without a formal constitution. By choice, it has conducted its affairs in a 
loose, informal way with few legally-binding arrangements and weak institutions.
112
 Indeed, the 
ASEAN way, a term derived from the Malay concepts of musjawarah
113
 and mufakat
114
 stresses 
decision-making by consensus.
115
 The approach involves conducting informal behind-the-scene 
discussions to reach a general consensus, which will form the starting point around which a unanimous 
decision is to be made at formal meetings. This can be contrasted with formal across-the-table 
negotiations which result in deals enforceable in a court of law.  
A brief discussion about the types of ASEAN instruments may be more instructive for our 
understanding of ASEAN. We have to state at the outset that the exact status of these ASEAN 
instruments is often unclear. The nomenclature of agreements, declarations, memoranda of 
understanding (MOU), policies and frameworks, and roadmaps is usually not indicative of whether 
these instruments impose binding obligations. This is because the criteria for classifying ASEAN 
instruments as treaties – e.g. intention of the parties, the use of hard law language, the need for 
ratification processes, etc. – remain unclear to date.116 A quick scan of the ASEAN Secretariat’s table 
of “ASEAN treaties” reveals this confusion.117  
Generally, with the exception of agreements pertaining to economic cooperation and dispute 
settlement,
118
 ASEAN instruments are political rather than legal in nature.
119
 On defence and security 
matters, the two key treaties remain the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)
120
 
and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).
121
 In short, the 
ASEAN Way is distinct from the formal legalism present in most Western international legal 
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institutions.
122
 Thus, descriptively, it may well be that perhaps ASEAN is less legalised than many of 
its Western counterparts. Nonetheless, ASEAN has realised that to avoid being left behind in the new 
global economy, it must grow beyond its “loose association”.123 The incumbent Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, has stressed 
ASEAN cannot be ad hoc and informal in its approach to community-building [but must] be more 
legalistic and more systematic” in spearheading regional integration efforts for not only ASEAN 
but the wider East Asian region to meet the challenges of “emerging economies, particularly China 
and India.
124
  
To that end, ASEAN has proclaimed: 
[t]he ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by 
providing legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, 
rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance… 
With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will henceforth operate under a new 
legal framework and establish a number of new organs to boost its community-building process. In 
effect, the ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN 
Member States.
125
 
Thus far, in the whole history of ASEAN, all legal obligations undertaken by the organisation has 
entailed the individual endorsement of each state, in line with the principle of consultation and 
consensus.
126
 If unanimity cannot be reached, the matter can be tabled at the ASEAN Summit for 
resolution,
127
 whereupon it is inevitable that the ten member states will compromise to breach the 
impasse. Contrary to popular perception, ASEAN’s practice of unanimity does not mean that the 
members who veto propositions impede ultimate decision-making. ASEAN being what it is will 
always try to reach an agreeable middle ground with all parties making certain concessions toward that 
end.
128
 There is more room for negotiation and movement with ASEAN economic integration where 
the “ASEAN minus X” formula may be applied – again, where there is consensus to do so.129 To date, 
ASEAN’s exercise of legal personality is somewhat limited. Under domestic law, ASEAN can enter 
into contracts, acquire and dispose of property, and engage in legal proceedings through the Secretary-
General, Deputy Secretaries-General or any member of the staff of the ASEAN Secretariat authorised 
by the Secretary-General.
130
 In the exercise of its capacities under international law, including entering 
into agreements, ASEAN shall continue to act through its representatives authorised by the Member 
States.
131
 It is obvious that with such will be some time before ASEAN has a distinct personality from 
its constituent member states.
132
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ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
133
 
As institutionalisation and legalisation develop in ASEAN, fora where disputes can be resolved 
typically follow. Since its establishment, ASEAN has developed three main mechanisms for dispute 
settlement. The first one was actually established less than ten years after the Bangkok Declaration, 
with the adoption of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Almost twenty years later, 
when economic integration became the focus of ASEAN, the member states adopted the 1996 
Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for disputes relating to ASEAN economic agreements, 
which was updated by the 2004 ASEAN Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (EDSM). Finally, Chapter VIII of the ASEAN Charter contains dispute settlement 
provisions that serve as an overarching framework for dispute settlement in ASEAN.
134
 The dispute 
settlement mechanisms provide under the TAC, the EDSM, and the ASEAN Charter have never been 
utilised by member states. 
A. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
The TAC was signed on 24 February 1976, in conjunction with the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 
which declared that “member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on 
peaceful process in the settlement of intra-regional differences”. The TAC in Article 13 sets out that 
member states should “refrain from the threat or use of force” and settle any disputes through “friendly 
negotiations”. Any unresolved disputes will be brought in front a High Council comprising ministerial 
representatives of all member states of ASEAN and ministerial representatives of non-ASEAN 
contracting parties that are directly involved in the dispute.  
All parties to the dispute must agree to submit the dispute to the High Council, before the High 
Council can recommend appropriate means of dispute settlement to the disputing parties, which 
include the High Council’s good offices, or constituting a committee for mediation, inquiry, or 
conciliation. The dispute settlement mechanism under the TAC, although an important achievement 
for ASEAN, is pretty much a validation of the ASEAN Way, where disputes can only be brought up to 
settlement mechanism by agreement of all parties. Furthermore, even if all parties agree to settle the 
dispute according to the TAC, the modes available are all non-legal modes, which show the reluctance 
of the member states to allow third parties to decide on international disputes between them. 
B. Protocol for the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
The 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) was signed in 
Vientiane in 2004 by the ASEAN Economic Ministers. It supersedes the 1996 Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, which in turn superseded the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments prior to it. The EDSM applies to disputes arising under the 1992 Framework 
Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, as well as all retroactively to earlier key 
economic agreements and to future ASEAN economic agreements. The essence of the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the EDSM is a mandatory dispute settlement process involving a panel 
established by the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) to assess disputes that cannot be 
settled through good offices, mediation, or conciliation. The panel will have sixty days to come up 
with recommendations,
135
 which then have to be adopted by the SEOM within thirty days, unless the 
SEOM decides by consensus not to adopt the recommendations, or a party decides to 
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appeal.
136
 Appeals will go to an appellate body established by the ASEAN Economic Ministers, which 
must decide on the appeal on the issues of law and interpretation within sixty days.
137
  
Under Article 16 of the EDSM, if a party fails to implement the findings and recommendations of 
the panel’s or the appellate body’s reports adopted by the SEOM within sixty days, then the party 
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may enter into negotiations with the other party to 
reach a mutually acceptable compensation.
138
 Failing to do so, the party having invoked the dispute 
settlement procedures may request authorisation from the SEOM to suspend the application to the 
member state concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
139
 The 
SEOM must grant this authorisation within thirty days of the expiry of the sixty day period unless 
there is a consensus against the request.
140
  
The system adopted under the EDSM follows the dispute settlement mechanism of the World 
Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding, albeit with even shorter timelines. To 
date, the EDSM and therefore the suspension have not been resorted to by ASEAN member states. 
Although this mechanism have never been invoked, it is interesting to note that Singapore in 1995 
(pre-dating the EDSM) and the Philippines in 2008 have preferred to invoke the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism against other ASEAN countries (Malaysia and Thailand, respectively) rather 
than use existing ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms. Although it is worthwhile to note that 
Singapore claim against Malaysia pre-dates the EDSM (Singapore lodged the complaint to WTO in 
1995, prior to the 1996 Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism). This suggests that 
ASEAN members themselves trust the multilateral WTO dispute settlement mechanism more than the 
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, including the EDSM. 
C. The ASEAN Charter 
Chapter VIII of the 2007 ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement provides a comprehensive framework 
for existing and future dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN. Article 24(1) of the ASEAN 
Charter provides that where specific ASEAN instruments provide for a dispute settlement mechanism, 
disputes would be resolved with reference to that mechanism. Article 24(2) states that disputes not 
concerning the application or interpretation of ASEAN agreements are to be resolved in accordance 
with the TAC, while Article 24(3) further provides that disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of ASEAN economic agreements would be settled in accordance with the ASEAN 
Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism. While these provisions do provide more 
certainty for enforcement, where there are no pre-existing dispute settlement mechanisms, Article 25 
of the ASEAN Charter suggests that “appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including 
arbitration, shall be established.” The application of this provision is further elaborated in the 2010 
Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (2010 Protocol), which provides 
for consultations within a fixed timeframe and the possibility to convene an arbitral tribunal.  
Aside from disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the ASEAN Charter, the 2010 
Protocol also applies to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of other ASEAN 
instruments that do not provide any means of settling such disputes, or other ASEAN instruments that 
specifically refer to the 2010 Protocol. The Protocol provides that a complaining party may request 
consultation to the responding party, in which case the responding party must reply to the request 
within thirty (30) days and must enter into consultation within sixty (60) days from the date of the 
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receipt of the consultation request. If, and only if, the responding party does not respond to the 
consultation request or if consultation fails to settle the dispute within ninety (90) days from the date 
of the receipt of the request for consultation, then the complaining party can request the establishment 
of an arbitral tribunal. Still, under the 2010 Protocol, an arbitration tribunal can only be convened if 
both parties agree to do so. If the responding party does not agree or fails to respond to the request 
within the period provided in Article 8(3) of the 2010 Protocol, then the complaining party may refer 
the dispute to the ASEAN Coordinating Council to decide on how the dispute is to be resolved, failing 
which, any party can refer the dispute to the ASEAN Summit. The problem is, there are no clear 
publicly available procedures or descriptions of how the ASEAN Summit should reach its decisions, 
whether it is by positive or negative consensus or any other methods. Moreover, since the ASEAN 
Summit is comprised of officials from all the member states, it will be difficult for the ASEAN 
Summit to reach a decision against one member state. 
The 2010 Protocol has some similarities with the dispute settlement procedure contained in North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute 
Settlement Procedures). Both mechanisms provide for consultation; good offices, mediation and 
conciliation; as well as arbitration. There are two main differences, however. First, NAFTA Article 
2007 provides that good offices, mediation, and conciliation can only be requested if consultation 
between the parties fails; and arbitration can only be initiated if good offices, mediation, or 
conciliation fails. Under the 2010 Protocol, good offices, mediation, and conciliation can be initiated 
at anytime by the parties; and the request for arbitration can be made after consultation fails to reach 
any settlement, without having to go through the process of good offices, mediation or conciliation. 
Second, NAFTA Articles 2008 and 2011 provide automatic establishment of arbitral tribunal once a 
request is made (although, in practice, this automatic panel appointment procedures cannot function, 
since the NAFTA Parties have never agreed on a Chapter 20 arbitrator roster and as a result the 
responding party can delay panel selection indefinitely). By contrast, in the 2010 Protocol, an arbitral 
tribunal can only be convened if the responding party agrees to such request. 
In light of this, Chapter VIII of the ASEAN Charter envisions the ASEAN Summit playing two 
roles. First, the ASEAN Summit is to act as a de facto final arbiter. When “a dispute remains 
unresolved” after the parties have used dispute settlement mechanisms available within the ASEAN 
framework, they can bring their dispute to the ASEAN Summit for its decision. Second, the ASEAN 
Summit takes on the role of “enforcing” a decision that has been reached using one of ASEAN’s 
dispute settlement mechanisms. If there is non-compliance with a decision, the member state “may 
refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision”. However, as the Charter is silent about 
decision-making at the ASEAN Summit level, this could mean resolution by the “ASEAN Way”, 
which means resolution through dialogue, consultation and negotiation.  
In both instances, the role of the ASEAN Summit as an arbitrator appears weak for two reasons. 
First, Article 7 of the ASEAN Charter does not prescribe a mechanism for the ASEAN Summit to act 
in this capacity. Is the Charter’s silence an implicit acknowledgement that the Summit is to adopt the 
consensus approach? If so, what if there is no consensus? Second, Article 7 does not oblige member 
states to comply with the decision of the ASEAN Summit. These uncertainties may need to be 
clarified in the future in order to facilitate the enhanced coordination between member states and the 
enforcement of decisions by the ASEAN Summit.  
Having mapped out descriptively some of the concerns about rule-making, monitoring, and 
enforcement for ASEAN, we now turn to the normative jurisprudential question of what sort of laws 
and institutions would be useful for ASEAN to have in order to promote the integration it wants. 
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In this regard, the epistemic standard of “legitimacy” as suggested by Buchanan and Keohane141 of 
“minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional integrity”142 may be an effective 
(even if largely utilitarian) method to evaluate ASEAN. While Buchanan and Keohane point out that 
their “three substantive conditions are best thought of as what Rawls calls ‘‘counting principles’’– “the 
more of them an institution satisfies, and the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger 
its claim to legitimacy”,143 the “legitimacy” of ASEAN as a regional institution may well be examined 
by applying these standards on ASEAN’s own terms. 
The Preamble to the ASEAN Charter concludes as follows:  
“We, the Peoples of the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations … [h]ereby 
decide to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.”  
Unlike prior ASEAN declarations and instruments, the Charter brings the legal and the institutional 
issues to the forefront of ASEAN’s objectives for the first time. As the “minimal moral acceptability” 
element is arguably satisfied by ASEAN’s declared (if not necessarily always enforced) adherence to 
basic human rights principles,
144
 the question becomes what sort of laws and institutions does ASEAN 
have currently and what would be useful for ASEAN to have to promote the integration it wants and 
therefore develop a stronger claim to “comparative benefit and institutional integrity”. 
Peng contends that the legal culture of East Asia differs considerably from the West’s because the 
former focuses on the Confucian principle of harmony and kinship while the latter stresses the use of 
formal legal rules to govern relationships.
145
 Peng argues that in the age of globalization, the 
prosperity of East Asia depends on the region’s adherence to the Western legalised framework of the 
WTO because Western legal culture has now transcended regional boundaries. Peng concludes that 
with East Asia’s extended stake in the WTO, the region has to reshape its legal culture to conform to 
WTO norms. This suggests is that while the starting point of a non-legal basis to international 
relationships may be a cultural preference in East Asia, that East Asian pragmatism usually trumps 
such cultural preferences. This may also be true for Southeast Asia.
146
 
It is submitted, that the juxtaposition of moves towards greater legalism on some issues 
(particularly economic integration issues) and a general tendency to prefer informal consensus on 
others suggests that the ASEAN Way is probably the result of political expediency instead of cultural 
determinism. In other words, ASEAN leaders made the strategic choice to pick the ASEAN Way 
rather than out of any deep-rooted Asian aversion to legalism. Therefore, it follows that if ASEAN 
members are convinced of the long-term advantages the AEC will bring to their self interests, the 
political will to adopt legalisation will likely surface regardless of any rhetoric about the importance of 
national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. 
Alvarez attempts to provide an alternative view to the thesis that the ASEAN region is under-
legalised.
147
 Alvarez’s objections to the lack of legalisation are mainly two-fold – first, that the 
region’s participation in non-binding institutions is not necessarily inconsistent with legal regimes 
because these alternatives to institutionalisation often work in tandem with or under the shadow of 
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formal international organisations; and second, the tri-fold emphasis on obligation, precision, and 
delegation misleads and is outdated because international law and institutions are increasingly diverse 
and cannot be confined to top-down, precise forms of obligation.  
The first objection while true for the areas under the umbra of those international organisations, 
does not provide comfort for the areas in the grey penumbra or in the areas outside the shadow itself. 
For example, if there are insufficient overlaps such as when ASEAN enters into internal WTO plus 
trade agreement like AFTA that provide for disciplines beyond those subject to the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, the global institutional supply may prove insufficient to resolve a dispute. 
ASEAN would need to develop a way to resolve that dispute and while it has done so for disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of ASEAN economic agreements by agreeing in the 
Charter that these would be settled in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism,
148
 which provides for a negative consensus rule for the adoption of any 
report,
149
 as highlighted above, the enforcement of the report is still likely to be subject to consensus.  
It is also true that international legal sources are no longer confined to treaty, custom, or general 
principles but include a welter of soft law whose content and legal effects involve the discourse of law. 
As such, to look only at hard legal institutions for the rule of law in ASEAN may be reductive and in 
the main, while the obligations may not be specifically enforceable through an adjudicative process, 
the international obligations are usually complied with due to the political costs resulting from non-
compliance. Many international agreements in any case provide for specific safety valves where the 
international political cost of non-compliance is outweighed by the domestic political costs thus 
allowing states in extremis to make a calculation to suspend certain obligations rather than to withdraw 
completely from the regime.
150
 
Nonetheless, that there has been a movement internationally towards a rules-based framework to 
regulate international economic relations, particularly as manifested by the WTO legal framework, is 
evident to most international economic law scholars.
151
 The reason for this is that in the absence of 
clear rules, the incentive to conform to domestic pressure could become over emphasized and the 
safety valve could become a gaping hole. This was true of the old GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism which required positive consensus before a report was adopted.
152
 The new WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding reversed this position to require negative consensus thereby creating a 
greater incentive for adherence to pre-agreed (and hard bargained as well as mutually exchanged) 
concessions.
153
 In contrast, within ASEAN, much economic cooperation has in the past been largely 
achieved by the ASEAN Way, which relies to a large extent on a personal and consensual approach 
though the advent of the Charter could signal a paradigm shift. 
Only time will tell whether this personal and consensual approach is part of the cognitive process 
of habituation and comfort-creation of ASEAN or it is an evolutionary cul-de-sac of ASEAN 
transformation. However, if ASEAN wants to be an institution providing “comparative benefit” for 
economic integration efforts then processes for the recognition and adherence to obligations arising 
from lengthy negotiation efforts should be eventually more developed. Further, if ASEAN is to exhibit 
“institutionally integrity”, a greater observance of the rule of law within ASEAN will be necessary for 
ASEAN to be taken seriously. 
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Indeed, the ASEAN approach may be changing in the face of the global phenomenon of 
legalisation and the impetus for greater economic integration within ASEAN. ASEAN’s former 
Secretary-General, Ong Keng Yong, has suggested that “ASEAN has to become increasingly more 
legalistic”, so that it could engage more in economic cooperation.154 Therefore, if the realisation of the 
AEC is an avowed aim of the Charter, the question is whether the Charter has taken a right step in the 
direction towards the AEC. Whether it can do so beyond the AEC is an even bigger question. 
Nonetheless, if ASEAN does not develop its institutional structures further, it may well be that 
other institutions may provide greater “comparative benefit” and thereby encourage individual 
member states to focus on other options for trade liberalisation such as the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum or if the individual member is economically attractive enough, bilateral 
deals with selected trading partners. Indeed, as variable geometry is already pre-agreed into the AEC 
in the form of ASEAN Minus X, ASEAN’s greatest challenge to its “comparative benefit” as a 
institution as well as an internally consistent institution that purports to represent the region may be 
ASEAN Minus X itself which allows some ASEAN members to move forward into deeper integration 
without the other members. 
III. Integration in the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities: Case 
study of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
Having analysed the predominantly economic driving force behind ASEAN integration and the 
general institutional and legal structures necessary to bring about closer community-building, we 
proceed to examine an ASEAN body which is entirely outside the realm of the ASEAN Economic 
Community for some contrast. We have chosen the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR) which straddles both the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural 
Communities. The APSC strives to ensure that “countries in the region live at peace with one another 
and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment”.155 In doing so, ASEAN 
member states  
[p]ledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences 
and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic 
location, common vision and objectives. It has the following components: political development; 
shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; post-conflict peace 
building; and implementing mechanisms.
156
 
As to the ASCC, ASEAN member states are  
[f]ocused on nurturing the human, cultural and natural resources for sustained development in a 
harmonious and people-oriented ASEAN… It seeks to forge a common identity and build a caring 
and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the 
peoples are enhanced.
157
 
We find that, as compared to structures related to the AEC, ASEAN integration in the first and third 
pillars is relatively slow, especially in the area of human rights. AICHR exemplifies this. It arguably 
lies at the other end of the spectrum of ASEAN priorities. Moreover, it is undoubtedly a weak 
institution which relies, if at all, on soft law. One could plausibly put this down to the abiding 
suspicion ASEAN member states have against human rights regimes – they view them as intrusive and 
interfere with member states’ internal affairs. I.e. human rights are diametrically opposite to the 
erstwhile practice of the ASEAN Way. 
                                                     
154
 Ong, supra note 30. 
155
 ASEAN Political-Security Community, Overview, at http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm 
156
 Ibid.  
157
 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, Overview, at http://www.aseansec.org/18770.htm 
The Role of the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration 
29 
Prior to the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN had mentioned its support (albeit in a somewhat vague 
manner) of human rights and the possibility of establishing a regional human rights mechanism in the 
joint communiqués of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers beginning from 1993.
158
 Momentum for this idea 
grew and as part of the transformation of ASEAN into a regional organisation with legal personality 
and credible international standing undertaken at its fortieth anniversary in 2007, ASEAN 
incorporated for the first time in a binding constituent instrument, the ASEAN Charter, that it would 
adhere to the principles of democracy and respect and protect human rights. Apart from the references 
to human rights and democracy throughout the ASEAN Charter,
159
 Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter 
provides that:  
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.  
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference 
to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
160
 
Subsequently, the Blueprints for the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities 
unveiled in January 2009 elaborated on the initiatives ASEAN would undertake to achieve this goal of 
promoting and protecting human rights. The APSC Blueprint stated that ASEAN should establish an 
ASEAN human rights body by 2009; take stock of ASEAN bodies that work on human rights issues, 
including the rights of migrant workers, women, and children, and improve the networks among them 
as well as with civil society; enhance information-sharing and public education on human rights; and 
work with other ASEAN sectoral bodies to establish the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children.
161
 Concomitantly, the ASCC Blueprint enunciated 
that ASEAN should safeguard the interests and rights of, provide equal opportunities, and raise the 
quality of life and standard of living for women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and 
migrant workers.
162
 
After prolonged and somewhat tense negotiations, AICHR was set up on 23 October 2009 pursuant 
to the adoption of the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (TOR).
163
 As the “overarching human rights institution in ASEAN”,164 AICHR is mandated to 
promote and protect human rights in accordance with international standards in the ASEAN region 
whilst “taking into account the balance between rights and responsibilities”165 and respecting the 
bulwark of “non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states”.166 Proceeding on a 
five-year work cycle,
167
 AICHR is primarily tasked with developing human rights strategies to 
complement ASEAN Community-building,
168
 the first of which is to come up with the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).
169
 Among other things, AICHR is also to promote human rights 
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capacity-building, increase rights awareness, encourage ASEAN member states’ accession to and 
ratification of international human rights instruments, and the full implementation of ASEAN 
instruments on human rights.
170
 It is also expected to come up with thematic studies on human rights 
issues in ASEAN and to submit an annual report on its activities.
171
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, AICHR has not achieved very much in its three years of existence. While 
its establishment in 2009 was considered a real milestone for human rights in the ASEAN region, its 
development thereafter has not met expectations. Out of the list of goals listed in the APSC and ASCC 
Blueprints, ASEAN has, in addition to the establishment of AICHR, set up the ASEAN Commission 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). The 
ASEAN Committee to Implement the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers (ACMW) has since reached a standstill over intra-regional tensions on the issue of 
illegal migrant labour flows. Leaving aside the work of the ACWC which is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we find that the most basic targets of AICHR have still yet to be met. The status of the Rules of 
Procedure governing how AICHR is to operate, its Five-Year Work Plan outlining the targets of its 
first cycle of tenure,
172
 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD)
173
 which is to enunciate 
clearly the rights (and responsibilities) of the peoples of ASEAN is still unclear. The AICHR Rules of 
Procedure and Work Plan are supposedly finalised but there is no public information on this to date, 
while the AHRD drafting process is still underway after a year’s delay. In the meantime, there has 
neither been any public education or awareness drive on human rights by AICHR nor any stocktaking 
or network-linking of human rights organisations in the ASEAN region. There has also not been the 
disclosure of AICHR’s annual report on its activities.  
What could possibly explain this phenomenon? It would be too simplistic to deride ASEAN’s 
human rights development exercise as mere window-dressing for the international audience. With 
human rights and democracy being integral principles of the international order, ASEAN understands 
that it must respect human rights and democracy in an authentic manner for it to be taken seriously on 
the global plane. However, there are genuine tensions with its erstwhile modus operandi – the ASEAN 
Way of non-interference – as ASEAN tries to embrace institutionalisation, legalisation, and human 
rights and democracy. Unlike in Europe where one must adhere to a certain level of human rights 
before being accepted into the community, the tenets of human rights and democracy are not a 
prerequisite of ASEAN Integration. Indeed, given the tension surrounding human rights in the drafting 
of the ASEAN Charter, the inclusion of Article 14 was considered a surprising coup and there was 
even greater surprise that the deadline of 2009 for the establishment of AICHR was met. 
There is good reason why AICHR remains the sole Asian human rights system even as Asian states 
ratify the international human rights treaties. Recalling the north-south, east-west divide on the 
universalistic and particularistic characteristics of human rights in the 1993 Bangkok and Vienna 
Declarations on human rights,
174
 Asia remains suspicious of the intrusiveness of human rights, 
viewing it as “Western imperialistic ideology” as vestiges of the 1990s “Asian values debate” persist. 
Nonetheless, the importance of human rights is making steady inroads in the ASEAN region through 
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the gradual democratisation of each ASEAN member state,
175
 the growing momentum of civil society 
movements internally and externally, the increased activity in the international order with other state 
actors and global institutions, and also not least because ASEAN is conscious of its reputation and 
does not want to be seen as a human rights violator. 
Institutionally, therefore, AICHR is intentionally weak. This is not only garnered from its 
ineffectuality and limited mandate thus far but that ASEAN member states have explicitly held that it 
should be so (though stronger powers might ostensibly be accorded to AICHR as it evolves). The TOR 
unequivocally states that “AICHR is an intergovernmental body and an integral part of the ASEAN 
organisational structure. It is a consultative body”.176 Indeed, the name finally agreed upon by the 
ASEAN member states is significant, particularly the inclusion of the term “intergovernmental”. 
Paragraph 3 of the TOR stresses that AICHR is “an intergovernmental body and an integral part of the 
ASEAN organisational structure”177 – the latter of which is essentially state-centric given that most 
decision-making in ASEAN is made by consensus.
178
 Member state dominance is further assured as 
the clause goes on to add that AICHR is a “consultative” body179 where the representatives are 
appointed by the respective member states, with each appointing government having the discretionary 
powers to replace its representative.
180
 Even if the AICHR representatives have strong experience in 
civil society work and continue to have connections with human rights NGOs, they expressly state that 
they act in their intergovernmental capacity when executing official AICHR duties.  
Consultation and consensus are repeatedly emphasised, in particular with respect to decision-
making where it has to be in accordance with Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter.
181
 There is therefore 
no mention of AICHR being an independent entity or the need for transparency and accountability. 
Rather, AICHR representatives are expected to discharge their duties impartially.
182
 In the exercise of 
its mandate and bearing in mind that “the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms rests with each member state”,183 AICHR is also not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of ASEAN member states and must adopt a “constructive and non-confrontational” and 
evolutionary approach to develop human rights norms and standards in the region.
184
  
As to legalisation, AICHR could be said to exemplify the classic ASEAN model of non- or soft 
legalisation. There are differences between the AICHR system and the other regional human rights 
systems which need to be pointed out. First, AICHR’s establishment is somewhat “inverted”. AICHR 
was set up with only a Terms of Reference and not a human rights treaty. Where the European, Inter-
American, and African systems were all established with a human rights convention, the rights which 
AICHR is meant to protect are as yet undefined. The ASEAN Declaration Human Rights (AHRD) was 
meant to be endorsed at the ASEAN Summit at the end of 2011 but is now slated for 2012. It must 
also be remembered that the AHRD is NOT a treaty – it does not impose binding obligations. In fact, 
none of the human rights documents in relation to AICHR – the TOR, Blueprints, Rules of Procedure, 
and Work Plan – is binding and there is no intention that they become so in the foreseeable future. The 
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specific protections which the AHRD is to be derived from are those outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the nine other core UN human rights treaties. This is despite the fact 
that the only two which all ten ASEAN Member States hold in common are the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). It is uncertain how comprehensive the list of rights covered by the AHRD 
will be, especially if the exigencies and cultures of every member state will have to be accommodated. 
It follows naturally from the above that AICHR is strictly an “intergovernmental” commission and 
there are no plans for the establishment of a court. In terms of enforcement mechanisms, AICHR does 
not have an individual petition system, reporting or monitoring powers, or other types of enforcement 
or dispute settlement mechanisms that human rights commissions are empowered with.
185
 In the event 
of interpretive differences of the TOR among the AICHR representatives, resolution would be 
deferred to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their annual meeting.
186
  
With this in mind, how should we understand AICHR, an ASEAN body of the political-security 
and socio-cultural pillars of integration? It might be fair to say that AICHR epitomises the other end of 
the spectrum on ASEAN Integration efforts. However, this does not mean that ASEAN is insincere 
about incorporating human rights as it integrates into a Community. As mentioned before, there is the 
tension between the desire to respect human rights and democracy and to be taken seriously in the 
international order and the ASEAN member states’ lingering suspicions of the impingement upon their 
sovereignty by human rights.  
Second, there is the issue of having adequate funding for the programmes AICHR wishes to carry 
out and, even more importantly, to have personnel familiar with human rights working in AICHR. 
Presently, only three out of ten AICHR representatives have experience working on human rights – 
Sriprapha Petcharamesree (Thailand),
187
 Rafendi Djamin (Indonesia), and Rosario Manalo 
(Philippines). It is interesting to note that those AICHR representatives who have a background in 
human rights work “struggle” within their limited mandate and are keen to expand the scope of 
AICHR’s powers. This has been evidenced in the aftermath of the Maguinadanao massacre of 
journalists in November 2009 where families of the victims (through various NGO representatives) 
petitioned AICHR to assist them in seeking redress.
188
 This was despite AICHR’s lack of mandate to 
conduct public inquiries and to hold onsite visits and investigations. In turn, certain elements within 
AICHR are receptive to stronger powers. For instance, the Indonesian AICHR representative, Rafendi 
Djamin, stated in response to the petition, “With all due respect to your families, of course, if it were 
up to me, I will take it up immediately. But AICHR is composed of ten countries. This will have to be 
discussed, especially how we are going to deal with the complaints. I can only say that I will do my 
best to really strengthen the position of AICHR – our power and mandate."189 
If human rights are to be genuinely integrated into ASEAN Community, ASEAN must clarify what 
it desires to achieve through AICHR and be committed to such goals. If the human rights priority for 
now is ASEAN’s traditional emphasis on social justice and development, e.g. human trafficking, 
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migrant labour, and the rights of women and children, then the requisite resources should be allocated. 
In terms of law, we should see the firming of human rights provisions as there is strong pressure for 
AICHR and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration to uphold international human rights norms, 
especially beginning with CEDAW and CRC. This will take some time and we cannot predict the 
timeframe but it is quite certain that this will occur. This would come within the wider rule of law 
framework that ASEAN is currently undertaking as it moves in the direction of coalescing into an 
ASEAN Community. Second, at the regional level, beyond AICHR, the ASEAN human rights 
framework encompasses the ACWC and ACMW. The ACWC, because it is empowered by the fact 
that all ten ASEAN States have ratified CEDAW and CRC, is trying to ensure that international 
human rights protections stipulated by these treaties are upheld in the region.  
There is also crucial need for the national infrastructure for access to justice be boosted. This would 
include local grassroots institutions, municipal courts, as well as national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs). Already we are seeing how synergies are being sorted out at the national level – 
international and regional human rights protections need to be effected and these are ultimately 
experienced on the domestic plane. We hopefully might expect clearer enunciation of rights 
protections within the domestic legal system and that these are weaved throughout national policy 
architecture. As such, it is necessary that national human rights institutions will be given stronger 
powers and the space to work with AICHR to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected in 
the region, and ultimately, that national courts will take human rights and constitutional protections 
more seriously so that there can be a true sense of the exhaustion of national remedies before we seek 
redress at the regional level.  
It should also be highlighted that the receptivity towards human rights varies with each ASEAN 
member state and while there is consensus for decision-making, there is usually some compromise – 
the decision taken is not just lowest common denominator of the member states’ preferences. Certain 
sections within ASEAN governments are increasingly supportive of human rights. We also see the 
effects of democratisation – Indonesia is a strong advocate of human rights having experienced its 
empowerment after the Suharto dictatorship. The same is true for the Philippines, Thailand, and 
indeed democracy and human rights are making inroads too in other ASEAN Member States. It is 
encouraging to hear from colleagues working on human rights in Myanmar that internal change is 
underway. The peoples of ASEAN do want things to change and are willing to improve human rights 
in society. Moreover, we believe it is fair to say that the AICHR representatives are serious about their 
mandate and are committed to ensuring that the AICHR is not a false front, despite the limits to their 
competencies. They are pushing boundaries and working out the parameters of their powers. This is 
especially so for the AICHR representatives from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand who have 
extensive human rights experience in the ASEAN region. 
While ASEAN economic integration is pushed forward due to external reasons such as the need for 
ASEAN to stay competitive, human rights integration is increasingly propelled by internal forces. This 
is because of the changing social dynamics in the region. We have all witnessed the transformative 
power of human rights – once it is instituted, it is hard to suppress its progress. Similarly, as the 
ASEAN region familiarises itself with human rights and participates more actively in its development, 
AICHR will inevitably be strengthened in the years to come. All this boils down to the key human 
rights proponents in ASEAN society. Civil society in the ASEAN region is very active and it is 
constantly pushing for AICHR to have full powers of a commission, meaning that it is governed by a 
human rights treaty, has powers of investigation and petition, and eventually establishes a human 
rights court. More generally, civil society is encouraging and pushing ASEAN member states towards 
more transparency and accountability where human rights are concerned, for example in the 
appointment of commissioners and the drafting of human rights policies.  
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At the governmental level, we are also witnessing internal changes as officials and civil servants 
engage more on, and indeed are encouraging of, human rights. Stable avenues of cooperation will 
emerge as transgovernmental alliances are forged between state and non-state actors.
190
 The 
concomitant political, generational, and societal changes within ASEAN states themselves have 
further enabled a greater space for engagement. With increasing esteem for democracy within ASEAN 
states, non-state actors increasingly operate as “transnational norm entrepreneurs” by educating the 
public and mobilising instruments for change. These communities would further push the boundaries 
in shaping a more conducive, rights-friendly environment despite state predominance. State officials 
having experienced greater democracy and convinced of human rights begin to work as “governmental 
norm entrepreneurs”, promoting human rights domestically and regionally.191 In time to come, these 
networks will help, in a significant yet nuanced manner, to enforce the soft norms of human rights as 
more information and expertise are shared, and state and non-state actors work to realise shared 
objectives.
192
  
Conclusion 
While there are areas that will need to be addressed as ASEAN evolves, the Charter does provide for 
some legal rules which are internally consistent with ASEAN enhanced cooperation and integration, as 
well as serve to move such integration efforts somewhat forward. Unlike prior ASEAN declarations 
and instruments, the Charter brings the legal and the institutional issues to the forefront of ASEAN’s 
objectives, and it will help guide ASEAN’s future. With that said, ASEAN must exhibit 
“institutionally integrity”, as a greater observance of the rule of law within ASEAN will be necessary 
for ASEAN to be taken seriously. 
ASEAN also needs to develop a more comprehensive way to resolve disputes. ASEAN has done so 
for disputes pertaining to ASEAN economic agreements by agreeing in the Charter to resolve such 
disputes in accordance with the EDSM. Like the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, the EDSM 
provides for a negative consensus rule to adopt a report, as highlighted above, which permits a report 
to be enforced as long as one member state supports it. In practice, however, that particular member 
state will likely face pressure from the other member states, and may choose to follow the consensus 
of the majority pursuant to the “ASEAN Way”.  
For non-economic disputes relating to agreements without their own dispute settlement mechanism, 
the 2010 Protocol applies. Although the 2010 Protocol has established a comprehensive procedure to 
decide disputes concerning the interpretation of the ASEAN Charter, arbitration can only be convened 
with the agreement of both parties. The alternative is to submit the dispute to the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council, and, if settlement still cannot be reached, then any party can submit the dispute 
to the ASEAN Summit. Thus, in the end the dispute could ultimately be resolved by means of 
informal consensus or dialogue. This seems to continue the “ASEAN Way” practice for non-economic 
disputes. 
This general tendency to prefer informal consensus over other means of dispute settlement is 
probably the result of political expediency instead of cultural determinism. Nonetheless, ASEAN 
members are convinced of the long-term advantages ASEAN integration will bring. The political will 
to adopt legalisation will likely surface regardless of any rhetoric about the importance of national 
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. This legalisation based on the existing rules will 
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probably develop, even in practice, once the process of cognitivism develops greater trust in the 
institutions amongst the ASEAN members. While there are areas that will need to be addressed as 
ASEAN evolves, the Charter does provide for some legal rules which serve to move regional 
integration efforts forward. Still, we hope that this is not the final legal chapter for ASEAN but rather 
a step in the development of a more effective regional entity that endeavours to make bargains 
(particularly economic ones) stick and relations work.  
Nonetheless, while there are areas that will need to be addressed as ASEAN evolves, the Charter 
does provide for some legal rules which are internally consistent with ASEAN cooperation and serve 
to move such integration efforts somewhat forward. Sticking with the vehicular metaphor, it does not 
matter whether the vehicle is less than precision engineered so long as it brings us to our destination. 
Still, it is hoped that this is not the final legal chapter for ASEAN but rather a step in the development 
of a more effective regional entity. It may well be that as ASEAN develops the ASEAN Way may be 
increasingly more restricted to the process of negotiation and legalisation may become more 
pronounced in the textual products of such negotiations so as to make the economic bargains stick. 
Regardless, choices will have to be made by the ASEAN members about how things should proceed. 
Finally, it should be again emphasized that the EU itself did not spring full grown from the minds 
of its Fathers, though eventually legalisation may have been an effective strategy for European 
Integration, much evolution and compromise were needed for the cognitive regionalism that we see 
today.
193
 It is, however, conceded that the currently weak legalisation in the ASEAN is perhaps an 
unusual basis for a regional integration project. Yet, to suggest that this is not regional integration of a 
sort is akin to suggesting that Impressionism is not art because it does not conform to the ideals of 
Renaissance art. ASEAN has gone beyond the ad hoc cooperation and confidence building exercises 
of its early years. Perhaps therefore while integration, like the elephant, may be difficult to define 
positively, integration may be defined by what it is not. It is not ad hoc, it is systemic and progressive, 
it is not time limited, it is open-ended and future oriented, and it is not only defined in terms of self-
interest but also defined by a sense of commonality and common interests. ASEAN integration 
ultimately will be judged by how much it delivers towards these common interests.  
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